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Abstract 
A Structural VAR model is employed to investigate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy 
shocks on stock market performance in Germany, UK and the US. A significant number of 
past studies have concentrated their attention on the relationship between monetary policy and 
stock market performance, yet only few on the effects of fiscal policy on stock markets. Even 
more we know little, if any, on the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on stock market 
performance when the two policies interact. This study aims to fill this void. Our results show 
that both fiscal and monetary policies influence the stock market, via either direct or indirect 
channels. More importantly, we find evidence that the interaction between the two policies is 
very important in explaining stock market developments. Thus, investors and analysts in their 
effort to understand the relationship between macroeconomic policies and stock market 
performance should consider fiscal and monetary in tandem rather than in isolation. 
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1.  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on stock market 
developments in the UK, the US and Germany. It is widely believed that monetary policy 
should not be examined in isolation from fiscal policy, and vice versa, as both their individual 
stances, as well as their interaction, play an important role in the economy and thus, we argue, 
that they also influence stock market performance. Even though a significant number of past 
studies have concentrated their attention on the relationship between monetary policy and 
stock market performance (see, inter alia, Fama and French, 1989; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1993; Jensen and Johnson, 1995; Thorbecke, 1997; Patelis, 1997; Conover, Jensen and 
Johnson, 1999; Gali and Gertler, 2007; Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009), only few investigate 
the effects of fiscal policy on stock markets (see, for example, Darrat, 1988; Jansen, Li, Wang 
and Yang, 2008; Agnello and Sousa 2010; Afonso and Sousa, 2011, 2012). In addition, we 
know little, if any, on the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on stock market performance 
when the two policies interact (Jansen et al., 2008). The aim of this study is to fill this void. 
Monetary policy authorities in their effort to maintain low inflation will mainly influence the 
economy’s interest rates. This established, it is argued that stances of monetary policy can 
influence stock market returns via five possible channels, namely (i) the interest rate channel, 
(ii) the credit channel (iii) the wealth effect, (iv) the exchange rate channel and (v) the 
monetary channel.  
On the other hand, fiscal policy stances can also influence stock market performance. Fiscal 
policy used in a Keynesian manner can support aggregate demand, boosting the economy and 
potentially driving stock prices higher. In contrast, classical economic theory focuses on the 
crowding out effects of fiscal policy in the market for loanable funds and of the productive 
sectors of the economy. Hence, fiscal policy could potentially drive stock prices lower 
through the crowding out of private sector activity.  Furthermore, from a Ricardian 
perspective (Barro, 1974, 1979) fiscal policy is impotent and as such will have no effect on 
stock markets.  
However, as aforementioned, the literature in this area of research has neglected the complex 
relationship between monetary and fiscal policy (Agnello and Sousa, 2010; Darrat, 1988). 
Examining the effects of monetary policy or fiscal policy on stock market performance is only 
half of the picture, unless the interaction of the two policies is also considered. This 
interaction can be rather complex as there are both direct and indirect channels through which 
fiscal policy could have an impact on monetary policy and vice versa. For example, fiscal 
policy may interact with monetary policy via (i) the impact of the government inter-temporal 
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budget constraint on monetary policy and (ii) the effect of fiscal policy on monetary variables, 
such as inflation, interest and exchange rates. 
In this regard, the main contributions of the paper to the existing literature can be described 
succinctly. First, we examine the role of both fiscal and monetary policy on stock market 
performance, considering their interaction, by employing a structural VAR framework. 
Second, we verify that the contribution of fiscal policy is indeed important and thus it is 
instructive to be considered in tandem with monetary policy. Third, in contrast with the 
previous studies we also consider a global demand shock, so as to allow for an exogenous 
shock to the economies under investigation. In addition, we include an income and a price 
shock as we consider these to be important in capturing the full dynamics of both monetary 
and fiscal impulse mechanisms to the stock markets.  
In short, results show that both fiscal and monetary policies influence the stock market 
performance in the countries under investigation, via either direct or indirect channels. More 
importantly, though, we find evidence that the interaction between the two policies is very 
important in explaining stock market developments. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 
describes the methodology and data used, Section 4 presents the empirical findings of the 
research and Section 5 concludes the study.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Monetary policy and stock market performance 
Stock markets have a multidimensional role to play in connection with monetary policy 
decision making. On one hand, stock market performance is greatly affected by innovations in 
monetary policy through several channels, while, on the other hand, stock prices reflect 
economic developments to a great extent and thus can be considered by monetary policy 
authorities in the conduct of policy decisions. In this regard, stock market performance not 
only responds to monetary policy decisions and affects the economy, but also provides 
feedback to central banks regarding the private sector’s expectations about the future course 
of key macroeconomic variables (Mishkin, 2001).  
One of the main channels through which monetary policy propagates the economy is the 
interest rate channel. This channel suggests that a change in interest rates will have an impact 
on the corporate cost of capital, which will eventually influence the present value of firms’ 
future net cash flows. Consequently, higher interest rates lead to lower present values of 
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future net cash flows, which, in turn, lead to lower stock prices. This channel represents the 
traditional Keynesian view of the transmission mechanism of interest rates.  
Another indirect monetary policy transmission channel, related to interest rate adjustments, is 
the credit channel. This channel suggests that the central bank can influence the level of 
investment taking place in a country by altering interest rates. In this regard, it is understood 
that the level of corporate investment will affect the market value of firms. This argument is 
predicated upon the fact that the market value of firms is affected by the present value of its 
future cash flows,. In this sense, higher corporate investment activity should lead to higher 
future cash flows, thus increasing the firm’s market value.  
An additional transmission mechanism is via the wealth effect, which suggests that a rise in 
interest rates will cut the value of long-lived assets, i.e. stock prices. The exchange rate 
channel also helps explain the way in which interest rates may influence stock prices. In 
particular, higher interest rates will lead to an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate, 
resulting in higher imports and lower exports. The latter has a negative effect on the 
competitiveness of the country, leading to a reduction in production, which will eventually 
lead to lower asset prices.  
Finally, according to Tobin (1969), and the Tobin’s Q theory of investment, higher interest 
rates will lead to lower stock valuation. A more Keynesian approach to Tobin’s Q theory, 
suggests that increased interest rates will cause a transfer of funds from the stock market to 
the bond market - assuming that only these two assets exist in the market - pushing stock 
prices down.  
For a thorough analysis of the main channels through which stock market prices disseminate 
monetary policy dynamics on the economy the reader is directed to the theoretical work of 
Mishkin (2001). Other contributors to this line of research include Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), King and Watson (1996), Iacoviello (2005), as well as, Sousa (2010).  
In recent years, a growing number of studies have analyzed the effects of monetary policy on 
financial markets. Authors such as Fama and French (1989), Jensen and Johnson (1995), as 
well as, Patelis (1997), concentrating particularly on the relationship between monetary policy 
decisions and stock market performance, argue that the predictability of the latter is greatly 
influenced by the monetary sector. Thorbecke (1997) and Conover et al. (1999) report a 
strong positive relationship between expansionary monetary policy and stock market returns. 
In a similar fashion, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Rigobon and Sack (2003), and more 
recently, Sousa (2010) provide evidence that there is a negative relationship between 
contractionary monetary policy and stock market performance.  
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In addition, monetary policy decisions affect stock prices not only through the trade-off 
between interest gains and stock returns, but also through their influence on investors’ 
expectations. Gali and Gertler (2007), Bjornland and Jacobsen (2008), Bjornland and Leitemo 
(2009), Kurov (2010), as well as, Castelnuovo and Nistico (2010) maintain that stock market 
prices are mainly forward looking and contain relevant information regarding expectations 
about the future. In this regard, monetary policy innovations can greatly affect these 
expectations.  
Pertaining to the readily available information incorporated in the financial markets, Rigobon 
and Sack (2003) and Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) opine that a reverse positive causation 
runs from the stock market to monetary policy, as well. By the same token, evidence that asset 
prices could constitute a source of turmoil and trigger the Central Bank’s response can be 
found in the empirical work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989, 2000). 
Turning to the countries under investigation in this particular study, it is worth noting that 
Tarhan (1995) and Laopodis (2010) report the absence of a consistent dynamic relationship 
between US monetary policy actions and US stock market responses. They further argue that 
the volatile nature of this relationship is mainly the product of changes in monetary policy 
authorities’ operating regimes. Most studies however suggest that there exists a strong 
negative relationship between monetary policy innovations and stock market performance in 
the United States. In this respect, Poole and Rasche (2000), Kuttner (2001), Bomfim (2003), 
as well as, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), among others, support the view that monetary policy 
decisions may influence financial markets in more than one way; that is, through their effects 
on real interest rates, expected future dividends, as well as, expected future stock returns.  
As aforementioned, Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) provide strong evidence of a simultaneous 
interaction, in the short-run, between changes in the monetary policy and stock market returns 
in the US. To be more explicit, on one hand, positive innovations on interest rates seem to 
exercise a negative effect on stock market returns, whereas, on the other hand, a positive 
shock in stock market returns positively affects interest rates. Crowder (2006), reports that 
positive innovations in the federal funds rate lead to a decline in equity returns. A systematic 
relationship between monetary policy and stock market returns in the US is also suggested by 
Becher, Jensen and Mercer (2008). Authors such as Bohl, Siklos and Sondermann (2008) and 
Kholodilin, Montagnoli, Napolitano and Siliverstovs (2009) have investigated the said 
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relationship for four major economies of Europe
1
. In assessing the effects of the European 
Central Bank’s decisions on European financial markets these authors proponent a negative 
and statistically significant relationship. Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, and O’Reilly (2009) on the 
other hand, report lack of impact of the Euro area monetary policy on German stock returns 
and attribute this to the longer-term nature of the German stock market compared to other 
European markets.  
With reference to the UK, evidence suggests that there is a strong negative influence of 
contractionary monetary policy on stock market performance. According to Bredin, Hyde, 
Nitzsche and O’Reilly (2007), changes in the UK policy rate have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on FTSE returns.  For a thorough explanation of movements in UK’s stock 
returns in connection with monetary policy decisions the reader is directed to the empirical 
work of Cuthbertson, Hayes and Nitzsche (1999). In short, these authors argue that stock 
market volatility may very well be attributed to investors’ expectations and in particular, to 
revisions in investors’ expectations about future dividends and expected returns.  
Finally, Castro and Sousa (2010) provide evidence that both the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Federal Reserve (FED) in formulating their monetary policy framework pay 
particular attention to the dynamics of financial wealth, whereas, the Bank of England (BoE) 
mainly considers housing wealth developments. 
In retrospect, past evidence tend to favour a negative relationship between changes in 
monetary policy and stock market developments. In addition, some limited evidence also 
suggests that stock market changes tend to exert a positive effect on interest rates.  
 
2.2. Fiscal policy and stock market performance 
The emphasis in the literature on the effects of macroeconomic policy choices on asset prices 
has focused on the role of monetary policy. Little attention has been paid to the role of fiscal 
policy in influencing asset prices; some exceptions include Darrat (1988), Jansen et al. (2008), 
Ardagna (2009) and Afonso and Sousa (2011, 2012). Darrat (1988) notes that “fiscal policy... 
has been virtually ignored” in representing policy actions which influence stock market 
returns. More than 20 years later, Agnello and Sousa (2010) second Darrat’s argument noting 
that there is still an “important gap in the literature...regarding the empirical relationship 
between fiscal policy actions and developments in asset prices” (pp. 2). In light of the current 
economic crisis and the increasing emphasis on the role of fiscal policy both as a tool of 
                                                          
1
 France, Germany, Italy and Spain.   
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economic stabilisation and a potential source of destabilisation it is increasingly important to 
gain a better understanding of the effects of fiscal policy on the economy, in general, and the 
stock market, in particular. 
This gap in understanding remains despite the fact that the theoretical effects of fiscal policy 
on asset markets have been set out since the late 1960s in papers by Tobin (1969), Blanchard 
(1981) and Shah (1984). Tobin (1969) places an emphasis on the role of the stock market on 
the relationship between the real and the financial side of the economy. The model set out by 
Tobin (1969) allows for both monetary and fiscal policy to affect stock market outcomes. 
Predominantly the discussion on the role of fiscal policy on asset markets focuses on its 
effects on interest rates and the confidence effects of the long-run sustainability of the 
budgetary position. Additionally, fiscal policy can influence the level of economic activity, 
which in turn, will have an impact on stock markets.  
From a theoretical perspective, the economic impacts of fiscal policy depend on whether one 
takes a Keynesian, Classical or Ricardian view of the economy. Keynesian theory sets out the 
prescription as to the appropriate role of fiscal policy in stabilising economic fluctuations. In 
particular, similar to automatic stabilisers, discretionary fiscal policy should also act in a 
countercyclical manner. The mix of discretionary and automatic stabilisers will depend on the 
extent and composition of the role of government in the economy. Contrary to the Keynesian 
view of fiscal policy, a Ricardian view stipulates that policy can have no impact on aggregate 
demand as any public borrowing will be offset by the private savings of rational households. 
On the other hand, classical economists emphasise that fiscal policy crowds out private sector 
activity in markets and thus, its effects will be less important in an economy which operates 
close to its potential output
2
. 
Even if demand management can work as set out in the Keynesian framework it is still not 
taken for granted that fiscal policy makers will use the policy in a stabilising fashion. The 
practicalities of how fiscal policy is employed will depend upon the political economy 
environment in which it is made.  A political economy approach emphasises that fiscal policy 
makers are unlikely to use discretionary fiscal policy in a countercyclical fashion; instead the 
outcome will either be a deficit bias (see, Buchanan and Wagner, 1977; Persson and 
Svensson, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990, for example), or procyclical fiscal policy (see, 
Lane 2003) or even a business cycle driven by fiscal policy shocks (Drazen 2000). 
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 Bernheim (1989) provides a review on the Keynesian, Neoclassical and Ricardian views on the effects of the 
fiscal deficit. 
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In short, in a theoretical context the economic effects of fiscal policy on the stock market may 
be positive, negative or inconsequential depending on whether one is to take a Keynesian, 
Classical or Ricardian view, respectively. The actual application and effects of fiscal policy 
on stock markets are an empirical matter to be investigated in this paper.  
Turning to the empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal policy and stock markets 
performance, we have already noted that this is rather limited. In an early study, Darrat (1988) 
finds that the fiscal deficit
3
 exerts a highly significant negative effect on current stock prices. 
The research by Agnello and Sousa (2010) also demonstrates that there is an immediate 
temporary negative response of stock prices to fiscal policy shocks. Afonso and Sousa (2011) 
consider separately the revenue and expenditure components of the fiscal deficit and find that 
government expenditure shocks have a negative effect on stock prices, while government 
revenue shocks have a small and positive effect. Ardagna (2009) finds that fiscal adjustments 
based on expenditure reductions are related to an increase in stock market prices. Van Aarle et 
al. (2003) and Laopodis (2010) also provide evidence that fiscal policy matters for stock 
prices. 
Hence, from the foregoing analysis, it is evident that stock markets tend to favour reductions 
in fiscal expenditure rather than an expansionary fiscal policy. 
Nevertheless, so far we were able to extract important conclusions in relation to the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy on stock market developments without considering the links 
between the two demand-side policies. Thus, even though both fiscal and monetary policy has 
been argued to be important independent policy determinants of stock prices, their impact 
may also be influenced by the policies’ interactions.  
For example, Jansen et al. (2008) maintains that the impact of monetary policy on the stock 
market varies, depending on fiscal policy stance. Thus, research in this area should consider 
both demand-side policies in a single framework. 
 
2.3. Fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
The potential conflicting assignments of fiscal and monetary policy give rise to an important 
strategic interaction between the two policy tools and the institutions in control of the policy 
leavers. There has been substantial interest in understanding the interactions between 
monetary and fiscal policy both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The theoretical 
literature has focused on the strategic elements of the interaction using tools of game theory, 
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 Darrat (1988) measures the fiscal policy stance using the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit. 
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while the empirical analysis has focused on the complementarity and strategic substitutability 
of monetary and fiscal policy.  
The interaction arises as both monetary and fiscal policy has implication for the output gap 
and inflation. We anticipate that the two demand-side policies interact through (i) the impact 
of government inter-temporal budget constraint on monetary policy and (ii) the effect of fiscal 
policy on monetary variables, such as inflation, interest and exchange rates (Muscatelli and 
Tirelli, 2005; Zoli, 2005). 
The inter-temporal budget constraint requires that government expenditure is financed 
through taxation, borrowing or seignorage. Sargent and Wallace (1981) outline the difficulties 
an unsustainable fiscal policy incurs for monetary policy. In the case of an independent 
monetary authority implementing a tight monetary policy in response to inflation the “tight 
money now can mean higher inflation eventually”(Sargent and Wallace 1981, p.2). This arises 
as deficit financing will eventually require monetary growth leading to higher inflation, when 
the interest rate is greater than the growth rate of the economy. In this regard, the extent to 
which the monetary policy can commit and fulfil its duties is rather influenced by fiscal policy 
decisions. Thus, an insolvent government would render monetary policy weak in dealing with 
future inflationary pressures (Buti et al., 2001, Sargent, 1999). 
An additional implication of an unsustainable fiscal policy is the increased default probability 
and sovereign risk premium, which can lead to capital outflows and currency depreciation. In 
the event that the country’s debt is mainly denominated in foreign currency, the exchange rate 
depreciation causes further increase in the country’s debt burden. However, this could give 
rise to a vicious cycle, as the exchange rate depreciation will cause inflationary pressures, 
which will then require interest rates to increase even further thus, triggering the same 
succession of the previously mentioned events all over again (Zoli, 2005).  
It is further argued (see, Dixit and Lambertini, 2000; Demertzis et al., 1999) that an agreement 
on the final intentions between the two policies is very important because if the central bank 
formulates disinflationary policies while the government is engaged in expansionary 
strategies then final outcomes will deviate significantly from the desired ones.  
Empirical investigations into the coordination and interaction of fiscal and monetary 
authorities assess how they actually behave in practice. Melitz (1997) in his seminal paper 
finds that monetary and fiscal policy tends to move in opposite directions. In a later paper 
Melitz (2000, pp.12) interpret this finding as “tightening (easing) of one instrument means 
less tightening (easing) of the other. Both instruments may still concurrently be tight (or easy 
as the case may be)”. Wyplosz (1999, pp.7) finds that “both attempt to keep inflation in check 
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and to conduct countercyclical policies, but each does less when the other moves in the same 
direction”.  
Given this actual behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities and the effects of both policies 
on stock prices it is important to allow for the interaction of both policies when assessing their 
impact on stock prices. Afonso and Sousa (2011), as well as, Van Aarle et al. (2003) 
emphasise the importance of integrating monetary and fiscal policy analysis into one 
framework in which the interactions and effects of both can be analysed. This is the main aim 
and contribution of this paper. 
 
3. Data and methodology description 
3.1. Data description 
We use quarterly data
4
 from 1991:1 until 2010:4 from three countries, namely Germany, UK 
and US. The variables under consideration are the global economic activity index, GDP, 
consumer price index, government expenditure
5
 (as a proxy for fiscal policy stance), M1 (as a 
proxy for money supply), 3-month interbank rate (as our interest rate instrument) and the 
stock market indices for these three countries, which are the DAX 30 for Germany, FTSE All 
Share for the UK and the Dow Jones for the US. The exogenous shock, which is 
approximated by the global economic activity index (GEA), is based on the dry cargo freight 
rates and it is constructed by Lutz Kilian (see, Kilian, 2009). All variables are real, seasonally 
adjusted and are expressed in growth rates.  
It is worth noting that there is no consensus in the literature with regards to the identification 
of the most appropriate measure to capture fiscal policy innovations (i.e. expenditure, taxation 
or borrowing – see, Afonso and Sousa, 2011). Furthermore, Fatas and Mihov (2001) use 
changes in government expenditure to capture fiscal policy shocks. There are two advantages 
of using public expenditure rather than a cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit or tax revenues. 
Firstly, different theories imply different economic dynamics following a change in public 
expenditure, while the effects of public revenue changes are qualitatively similar (Fatas and 
Mihov, 2001). Additionally, focusing on public expenditure does not require modelling the 
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 Quarterly data is the highest frequency that will allow the fiscal policy variable to produce meaningful results. 
Thus, the choice of quarterly data was driven by the frequency of the fiscal policy variable. Furthermore, the use 
of Industrial Production index reflects only a small part of GDP activity (approximately 30%) and thus we 
preferred the use of GDP, which is also available in quarterly frequency. 
5
 For the US and UK we use quarterly ESA 1995 accruals based data. The UK government expenditure data is 
total current expenditure and the US data is primary government expenditure. We have not been able to obtain 
accruals base data for Germany. The German government expenditure data refers to total general government 
expenditure. 
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contemporaneous interaction between taxes and economic activity. The elasticities of 
government expenditure with respect to output for our sample countries are estimated to be 
zero according to sources cited in Afonso and Sousa (2009). For these reasons government 
expenditure is employed in this paper to capture fiscal policy innovations. 
A visual representation of the series can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
3.2. Methodology 
We examine the dynamic relationship among fiscal and monetary policy and the stock market 
performance, using the SVAR framework. In particular, we consider the following variables 
in our model: global economic activity, GDP, inflation, government spending, money supply, 
interest rates and stock market returns. Contrary to the existing literature and given the 
variations in the conduct of monetary policy outlined in Section 3, we incorporate GDP and 
inflation to the model in order to capture the full dynamics of both monetary and fiscal policy 
impulse mechanisms
6
. In addition, a global economic activity index is employed as the 
exogenous demand variable, capturing the links of the countries under investigation with the 
world economy, as well as, events of imported inflation
7
.   
The structural representation of the VAR model of order p takes the following general form: 
t
p
i
itit εyAcyA  


1
00  
(1) 
 
where, ty  is a 7×1 vector of endogenous variables, i.e.  tttttttt smimsgovygea  , , ,,,, y , 
0A  
represents the 7x7 contemporaneous matrix, iA are 7×7 autoregressive coefficient 
matrices, εt is a 7×1 vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have zero covariance. The 
covariance matrix of the structural disturbances takes the following form 
                                                          
6
 In this study we use accumulated impulse responses. The motivation for this approach is that fiscal policy tends 
to have a long-term effect, which can be better shown by the use of accumulated impulses. The accumulative 
impulse responses have been used in previous studies such as those by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramos and 
Roca-Segales (2008) and Mountford and Harald (2009). 
7
 A number of past studies have used oil prices as a primitive shock in the structure of an SVAR model (Kim and 
Roubini, 2000; Sims and Zha, 2006; Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009). Nevertheless, as shown by Hamilton 
(2009a,b) and Kilian (2009), due to the fact that oil prices changes depend on the origin of the oil price shock, 
their effect is not straightforward. Thus, the use of oil prices as a primitive shock, without identifying the origin 
of the shock, could be misleading. On the other hand, the Global Economic Activity indicator is a variable that 
captures world economy fluctuations without having an ambiguous interpretation. 
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where, gds = global demand shocks, is = income shock, ps = price shock, es = 
government/public expenditure shock, mss = money supply shock, mpt = interest rate shock 
and ss = stock market shock.  
The analysis will concentrate on the interaction between the macroeconomic policies and 
stock market developments. Thus, in the same spirit with Bjornland and Leitemo (2009), we 
identify the global demand shock, the income shock and the price shock from their respective 
equations, however these are left, at large, uninterpreted.  
The restrictions in our model can be explained, as follows: Income is contemporaneously 
influenced by an exogenous global demand shock, which is denoted by the global economic 
activity index, in this study. However, GDP cannot be contemporaneously influenced by any 
other variable (Kim and Roubini, 2000). On the contrary, it can contemporaneously influence 
all other variables. Furthermore, inflation reacts contemporaneously only to an income shock 
and a global demand shock, i.e. imported inflation (Kim and Roubini, 2000; Bjornland, 2008). 
Both monetary and fiscal policy tools react contemporaneously to income and price shocks 
(Kim and Roubini, 2000; Afonso and Sousa, 2011), however monetary policy is also 
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influenced contemporaneously by the public expenditure shock due to the  interaction 
between the two policies in reaction to income and price shocks (Wyplosz, 1999; Melitz, 
2000). Interest rates are influenced contemporaneously by the global demand shock, the 
public expenditure shock (i.e. we allow for contemporaneous crowing out effects), the money 
supply shock (Sims and Zha, 2006a,b; Van Aarle et al., 2003; Kim and Roubini, 2000; 
Elbourne, 2008) and the stock market shock (Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009). Finally, stock 
market returns are influenced contemporaneously by all variables (Bjornland, 2008). 
To proceed to the estimation of the reduced form of model (1), it is first necessary to establish 
the stationarity of the variables. The ADF and PP unit root tests suggest that all variables are 
I(0), as shown in Table 1.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The order of the VAR model was identified using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The AIC suggested a VAR model of order two. The model does not suffer from 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity, as suggested by the serial autocorrelation LM test, 
portmanteau joint test and White heteroscedascitity test. Tables 2-5 report the lag length 
criterion and diagnostic tests. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Contemporaneous relationships 
In Table 6 we report the estimated contemporaneous coefficient. The focus of our discussion 
is on the effects on the stock market.  
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
The UK stock market is not contemporaneously influenced by any of the chosen variables. In 
addition, we observe an interrelationship between monetary and fiscal policy, as this is 
evidenced by the negative coefficient of α64. For both the US and Germany, evidence suggests 
that their stock markets are positively affected by GDP contemporaneously. For these 
countries we cannot report any contemporaneous interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policy.    
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4.2. Accumulated impulse responses 
4.2.1. United Kingdom 
The results in Figure 3 confirm that both fiscal and monetary policy do affect the stock market 
in the UK. A positive government expenditure shock causes a decline in the stock market. 
This finding is in line with Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), Ardagna (2009), Agnello and 
Sousa (2010) and Afonso and Sousa (2011, 2012). On the monetary policy side, a positive 
interest rate change causes a decline in the stock market (similar findings were reported for 
the UK by Bredin et al., 2005). The only other determinant of the stock market, as evidenced 
from the impulse response functions, is GDP. The stock market reacts favourably to a positive 
income shock, although this effect is not very significant. This may be due to feedback in the 
relationship between GDP and the stock market as the latter is shown to be a significant 
determinant of the former.   
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
In addition, results suggest that fiscal and monetary both react in a countercyclical manner in 
response to the price level but they fail to react to a GDP shock. The common countercyclical 
response of both fiscal and monetary policy to the price shock shows that the two policies are 
being used in a complementary manner, consistent with the findings of Wyplosz (1999), 
Melits (2000), as well as, Van Aarle et al. (2003). 
With reference to interest rates, they seem to react negatively to a fiscal policy shock but do 
not respond to a money supply shock, as expected. This reaction of the interest rates to fiscal 
policy is not in the direction consistent with the crowding out hypothesis. The observed 
inconsistency may be due to the fact that we are considering a public expenditure shock rather 
a public borrowing shock. This finding can also be interpreted as an additional indirect 
channel through which fiscal policy affects the UK stock market.  
In retrospect, we provide evidence that not only both policies directly affect stock market 
performance, but also, that the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy is important in 
explaining stock market developments.  
 
4.2.2. Germany 
The reaction of the stock market to policy innovations is also evidenced in the case of 
Germany, as displayed on Figure 4. The German stock market responds positively to money 
supply growth but fails to respond to government expenditure shocks. The results also suggest 
that a positive money supply shock puts downward pressure on interest rates. Theoretically, a 
reduction in interest rates is predicted to have a positive effect on the stock market. In the case 
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of Germany, this effect is being captured through money supply and it possibly explains why 
the interest rate itself is not shown to impact the German stock market. The latter finding is in 
line with the empirical work of Bredin et al. (2005), who also suggested that the German 
stock market is not influenced by the interest rates. The fact, that money supply exercises an 
impact to the stock market, signifies the importance of the money supply inclusion in the 
model. Given that money supply affects the stock market directly and not via the interest rate 
channel (although interest rates are affected by money supply changes), is a potential 
consequence of the fact that Germany does not have its own independent monetary policy 
authority. Thus, changes in European interest rates may or may not reflect the needs of the 
individual countries and thus they may or may not exercise a direct affect on their national 
stock markets. By contrast, if interest rates in Germany were determined by the Central Bank 
of Germany, we would anticipate the stock market to directly reflect this information.  
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that income shocks exert a positive effect of the German 
stock market, whereas price shocks have the opposite impact. There is no evidence that the 
stock market exercises any effects on the other variables. 
Turning to the responsiveness of the policy tools, German fiscal policy is not shown to react 
to any of the variables, with the exception of inflation. On the other hand monetary policy is 
shown to be more reactive. Money supply acts in a countercyclical manner to a GDP shock. 
Additionally, countercyclical monetary policy is evidenced through the positive reaction of 
the interest rate to innovations in both GDP and the price level. 
Overall, we observe that there is no direct effect of fiscal policy on the stock market; 
however, in its effort to correct output-driven inflationary pressures, public expenditure in 
Germany seems to exercise an indirect effect on stock market returns. By contrast, money 
supply has a direct effect on stock market developments which does not pass through the 
interest rate channel.  
 
4.2.3. United States 
In relation to the US, a money supply shock negatively influences interest rates, which, in 
turn, are shown to have a negative impact on the stock market (as shown in Figure 5). Thus, 
money supply exercises an indirect effect on the US stock market. Furthermore, our findings 
do not suggest that fiscal policy has any direct effect on the stock market. In addition, positive 
income shocks lead to higher stock market performance. Turning to the effects of the stock 
market on other variables, we observe that positive stock market innovations lead to higher 
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interest rates, higher GDP, as well as, lower government spending. The bidirectional 
relationship between the US stock market and the interest rates has also been documented by 
Bjornland and Leitemo (2009). An interesting finding is that the US stock market 
performance triggers a positive response in terms of global economic activity. The latter 
finding signifies the importance of the US stock market in the world economy. This is in line 
with the theoretical scheme of the financial accelerator, proposed by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).  
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Furthermore, the US government spending is shown to exhibit a positive and significant effect 
on money supply. Having established that there exists an indirect link between money supply 
and the stock market; this finding provides evidence in favour of an additional indirect link, 
that between government spending and the stock market.  
In addition, interest rates negatively affect the fiscal variable. As in the case of the UK this is 
an indication that monetary policy and fiscal policy are moving in complementary directions. 
Thus, the interaction between the two policies is obvious in the case of US, as well. 
Although fiscal policy does not determine any other economic or financial variables, it does 
react to both GDP and interest rate innovations. The positive reaction of government 
expenditure to GDP can be interpreted as pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Contrary to fiscal policy, monetary policy is shown to be conducted in a countercyclical 
manner, as suggested by the response of interest rates to GDP and inflation shocks. In 
particular, positive GDP shocks raise concerns about higher inflation and increasing interest 
rates can be considered to be a countercyclical policy. 
To summarize, the US stock market reacts to monetary policy and fiscal policy via direct and 
indirect channels (i.e. monetary policy exercises both a direct (through interest rates) and an 
indirect impact (through money supply), whereas the fiscal policy exercises only an indirect 
effect through money supply).  
 
4.3. Is the fiscal policy variable important? 
In this section we estimate the SVAR model as in equations 1 and 2 using the same 
identification scheme, although we remove the fiscal policy variable (fiscal-exclusive 
model)
8
. The purpose of this section is to verify that the incorporation of the fiscal policy in 
                                                          
8
 The results regarding the statistical test justifying the exclusion of the fiscal variable are available upon request.  
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equations 1 and 2 (fiscal-inclusive model) adds significant value to the understanding of stock 
market innovations. Hence, the short run restrictions are as follows: 
 






























































sm
t
i
t
ms
t
t
y
t
gea
t
ss
t
mpt
t
mss
t
ps
t
is
t
gds
t
e
e
e
e
e
e
aaaaaa
aaaa
aaa
aaa
aa
a
,6
,5
,4
,3
,2
,1
666564636261
56555451
444342
333231
2221
11
,6
,5
,4
,3
,2
,1
00
000
000
0000
00000







 
 
Focusing on the relationships between interest rates, money supply and stock market we are 
able to make several important observations and to compare them to the findings of our 
original model, which incorporated the fiscal policy instrument.  
In the case of the UK we observe that in the absence of a fiscal policy instrument, interest 
rates do not seem to exert a significant impact on stock market developments. Furthermore, 
contrary to evidence from the fiscal-inclusive model, stock market shocks tend to affect 
interest rates positively (see Figure 6). In addition, under the fiscal-exclusive model, we 
cannot claim that neither interest rates nor the stock market respond to a price shock, as it was 
the case in section 4.2.1. 
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
Turning our attention to the impulse responses for Germany (see Figure 7), we are able to 
document that stock market responds to interest rate shocks, which is a different finding 
compared to what was identified in section 4.2.2. Furthermore, under the fiscal-exclusive 
model, stock market shocks in Germany tend to affect negatively the interest rates; a result 
opposite to what has been shown in the earlier section.  
[FIGURE 7 HERE] 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the impulse responses for the US in the absence of a fiscal policy 
variable. In the fiscal-exclusive model we observe that the stock market responds negatively 
to an interest rate shock. In addition the money supply seems to react positively to a stock 
market shock. These results are different than those reported in section 4.2.3.  
[FIGURE 8 HERE] 
In this regard, we are able to suggest that the incorporation of the fiscal policy variable has 
added significant value to the explanation of stock market developments, considering that 
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there are several reactions that are different when the fiscal policy is excluded from the 
model.  
Further robustness checks include altering the order of the policy variables and we also 
consider long-term interest rates. Results are qualitatively similar for all these alternative 
approaches
9
.  
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
In this study we use a structural VAR model to investigate the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policy shocks on stock market performance in Germany, the UK and the US. Using quarterly 
data for the period 1991:1-2010:4 we find evidence suggesting that both fiscal and monetary 
policy affect stock market, either directly or indirectly. More importantly, though, we find 
evidence that the interaction between the two policies is very important in explaining stock 
market developments. 
More specifically, the individual stances of fiscal and monetary policy, as well as their 
interaction, directly affect the UK stock market developments. With reference to Germany, 
we cannot find evidence of a direct effect of the fiscal policy on stock market performance, 
although an indirect effect can be shown, via the interest rate channel. Money supply, on the 
other hand, appears to have a positive effect on DAX 30, which is not filtered through the 
interest rate channel. Thus, evidence for Germany suggests that the interaction between fiscal 
policy and interest rates is also important in explaining innovations in DAX 30. Finally, the 
US money supply affects interest rates, which in turn negatively affect the stock market. Dow 
Jones does not appear to receive any direct influence from fiscal policy. Nevertheless, given 
that a link between fiscal expenditure and money supply is established, we argue that the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary variables is also important in deciphering the US 
stock market developments. 
The robustness checks stress the importance of incorporating both fiscal and monetary 
policies in a single framework, as their interaction appears to have a significant contribution 
to the analysis of stock markets behaviour. 
These results have important implications for both investors and analysts as in their effort to 
understand the relationship between macroeconomic policies and stock market performance 
they should consider fiscal and monetary policy in tandem rather than in isolation. 
                                                          
9
 Results are available upon request. 
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The identification of the effects of anticipated and unanticipated policies on national stock 
markets, within the framework of this study, is a promising area for future research. In 
addition, it is essential that further studies involve the examination of countries with 
significantly different monetary policies regimes (e.g. countries with exchange rate targeting 
central bank). 
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Figure 1: Global Economic Activity Index 
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Figure 2: Growth rates of variables for Germany, UK and US 
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Figure 3: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Inclusive Model – UK 
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, government expenditure, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Inclusive Model – Germany 
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, government expenditure, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
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Figure 5: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Inclusive Model – US  
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, government expenditure, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
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Figure 6: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Exclusive Model – UK  
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
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Figure 7: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Exclusive Model – Germany  
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
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Figure 8: Accumulated Impulse Responses – Fiscal-Exclusive Model – US  
 
Note: Shocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 refer to shocks from global economic activity, gdp, inflation, money supply, interest rates and stock market, respectively. 
 
 
 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock1
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock2
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock3
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock4
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock5
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_M1 to Shock6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock1
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock2
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock3
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock4
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock5
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_INT_R to Shock6
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock1
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock2
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock3
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock4
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock5
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12
Accumulated Response of R_IND_R to Shock6
Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
33 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
   
ADF 
 
prob. 
 
PP 
 
prob. 
 
GEA 
 
-8.874 
 
0.000 
 
-8.907 
 
0.000 
UK R_Y 
 
-5.726 
 
0.000 
 
-5.848 
 
0.000 
 
R_CPI 
 
-2.673 
 
0.084 
 
-8.616 
 
0.000 
 
R_GOV 
 
-9.821 
 
0.000 
 
-9.821 
 
0.000 
 
R_M1 
 
-9.310 
 
0.000 
 
-9.299 
 
0.000 
 
R_INT 
 
-4.936 
 
0.000 
 
-4.936 
 
0.000 
 
R_IND 
 
-7.130 
 
0.000 
 
-7.146 
 
0.000 
Germany R_Y 
 
-6.482 
 
0.000 
 
-6.511 
 
0.000 
 
R_CPI 
 
-5.595 
 
0.000 
 
-5.606 
 
0.000 
 
R_GOV 
 
-11.929 
 
0.000 
 
-12.157 
 
0.000 
 
R_M1 
 
-6.890 
 
0.000 
 
-6.890 
 
0.000 
 
R_INT 
 
-4.797 
 
0.000 
 
-4.797 
 
0.000 
 
R_IND 
 
-7.157 
 
0.000 
 
-7.166 
 
0.000 
US R_Y 
 
-4.710 
 
0.000 
 
-4.710 
 
0.000 
 
R_CPI 
 
-2.614 
 
0.095 
 
-3.227 
 
0.022 
 
R_GOV 
 
-8.794 
 
0.000 
 
-8.791 
 
0.000 
 
R_M1 
 
-3.345 
 
0.016 
 
-7.502 
 
0.000 
 
R_INT 
 
-8.852 
 
0.000 
 
-8.916 
 
0.000 
 
R_IND 
 
-6.960 
 
0.000 
 
-7.036 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Optimal lag length – AIC 
Lag UK Germany US 
0 -24.9394 -23.6284 -26.8774 
1 -25.9209 -24.4782 -27.9380 
2  -26.2863*  -24.8907*  -28.2971* 
3 -26.1581 -24.4877 -28.2539 
4 -26.2285 -24.3190 -28.0156 
*Denotes optimal lag length 
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Table 3: VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
Lags df UK Germany US 
    Q-Stat Prob. Q-Stat Prob. Q-Stat Prob. 
1 NA* 15.07647 NA* 15.87062 NA* 22.09707 NA* 
2 NA* 43.49633 NA* 34.19935 NA* 44.21211 NA* 
3 49 55.85724 0.2328 57.62205 0.1864 60.99936 0.1167 
4 98 114.3761 0.1235 112.6434 0.1479 107.9626 0.2308 
5 147 168.2189 0.1110 160.7684 0.2067 164.8312 0.1493 
6 196 220.4298 0.1113 219.5989 0.1189 216.3948 0.1515 
7 245 270.0058 0.1306 259.4142 0.2518 270.5263 0.1261 
8 294 321.5324 0.1294 315.8406 0.1823 322.3796 0.1226 
9 343 376.7101 0.1016 369.3586 0.157 358.1522 0.2757 
10 392 417.3177 0.1816 408.286 0.2751 406.161 0.3003 
11 441 446.401 0.4194 450.164 0.3711 440.1045 0.5031 
12 490 485.286 0.5516 488.3014 0.5132 476.0297 0.6661 
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
 
 
Table 4: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Lags UK Germany US 
  LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob 
1 61.74404 0.1045 45.89823 0.5996 53.92253 0.2917 
2 58.66905 0.1622 49.94493 0.4356 56.9677 0.2028 
3 54.61245 0.2698 57.56752 0.1878 48.26431 0.5029 
4 55.56965 0.2411 45.06082 0.6335 43.32297 0.7017 
5 52.25551 0.3487 50.44987 0.4159 60.86576 0.1191 
6 59.89797 0.1368 39.97021 0.8177 41.66421 0.7622 
7 43.31528 0.7019 44.828 0.6429 52.83771 0.3282 
8 57.20676 0.1967 63.15657 0.0842 53.7728 0.2966 
9 56.88338 0.205 60.79706 0.1203 41.87293 0.7549 
10 45.95772 0.5972 54.09453 0.2862 58.35239 0.1693 
11 36.8566 0.8992 50.43688 0.4164 43.25518 0.7042 
12 56.6367 0.2115 47.1313 0.5492 46.63132 0.5697 
Probabilities from chi-square with 49 df 
 
Table 5: White Heteroscedasticity test 
  UK Germany US 
Chi-sq 861.2179 854.0547 856.5471 
df 812 812 812 
Prob. 0.1123 0.1486 0.1351 
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Table 6: SVAR results - Contemporaneous coefficients 
Coefficient UK Germany US 
α11 1.40527* 1.5893* 1.49954* 
α21 0.00066 -0.0001 -0.00024 
α22 0.00607* 0.0081* 0.00550* 
α31 0.00064* 0.0000 0.00008 
α32 0.17761* 0.1127* 0.07827* 
α33 0.00229* 0.0032* 0.00109* 
α42 -0.53373 -0.3913 0.80571* 
α43 -4.74495* -1.1993* 0.42261 
α44 0.02536* 0.0177* 0.01111* 
α52 0.11185 -0.0796 -0.80501* 
α53 -1.39260 -3.2522* -3.96834* 
α54 -0.00122 0.0682 0.25296 
α55 0.02162* 0.0206* 0.01436* 
α61 0.01037 -0.0225* -0.01388 
α64 -3.32641* -0.2361 3.47329 
α65 -0.51400 -1.4746* -2.13638* 
α66 0.09442* 0.0820* 0.22182* 
α71 -0.00469 -0.0077 0.00161 
α72 1.50874 2.6297* 4.29761* 
α73 3.35597 0.8072 -2.58190 
α74 -0.31411 -0.3748 0.05437 
α75 0.13110 -0.2192 -0.11259 
α76 0.08312 -0.0373 0.04547 
α77 0.06005* 0.0901* 0.06127* 
* significant at 5% level. 
 
 
